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Joseph Stiglitz was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics in October 2001, for 
his contributions to the study of Imperfect Information. Eight months before this happy 
news, a group of his teachers, students and co-authors had come together to pay tribute to 
Joe by writing essays in his honor, to mark his 60th birthday in 2003. This volume is the 
result of those contributions. 
 
The collection of authors in this volume reflects the impact that Joe has had on the 
profession of economics. They include four Nobel Prize winners, the President of an Ivy 
League University, the head of an Oxford College, the present Chief Economist of the 
World Bank, and other recognized leaders in economics from the leading universities 
around the world. The areas covered in this volume also reflect the “Stiglitzian” 
influences on much of economics today. The impact of his work is of course most 
strongly seen in the area of Imperfect Information, for which he won the Nobel Prize. But 
his influence extends to many other areas, including Macroeconomics, Public Economics 
and Development Economics, counting in the latter the problems of Transition from 
centrally planned to market economies. Throughout, Joe’s focus has been on the world as 
it actually is, with all of its imperfections—whether of information, competition, or 
government—rather than the world often depicted in the basic economics textbooks. 
Hence the title of this volume—Stiglitz’s economics is truly Economics for an Imperfect 
World.  
 
On a more personal level, the authors who contributed to this volume along with 
the editors, have all felt the effect of Joe Stiglitz on their lives, in his role as student, 
teacher, mentor and co-author. Joe’s remarkable impact on the economics profession is 
rivaled only by his personal impact on economists the world over.  
 
Joe Stiglitz was born in Gary, Indiana, in 1943. The grim realities of that 
declining steel town, with its stark inequalities and sharp racial discrimination, raised 
questions early on about these outcomes and the processes that led to them. He did his 
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undergraduate studies at Amherst College, where he was a leader of the student body. He 
took part in the great civil rights march in Washington, D.C. in 1963 and heard Martin 
Luther King give his “I have a dream” speech, another lasting influence on his thinking. 
He did his Ph.D at MIT, and two of his teachers, Noble Prize Winners Paul Samuelson 
and Robert Solow, have contributed papers to this volume.  
 
He became a tenured full professor at Yale at the age of 27. Between 1969 and 
1971 he was at the Institute for Development Studies, Nairobi, Kenya. The stay in a 
developing country led not only to his abiding interest in the problems of development, 
but also led him to ask questions of received economic doctrine, questions which 
eventually led to research that won him the Nobel Prize. After Yale, he taught at 
Stanford, Oxford, Princeton, and then Stanford again. This quarter century of research 
established him as one of the giants of economics, his contributions ranging across every 
part of the discipline and winning him the coveted Clark Medal of the American 
Economic Association. His co-authors from that prolific period are well represented in 
this volume. At every University where he taught, he imbued generations of graduate 
students with his infectious enthusiasm for ideas, and in his belief in the capacity of 
economic analysis to lead to a better world, provided it brought to center stage the 
imperfections of the real world. These students are proud to have studied under Joe and 
many of them, now leading economists in their own right across the world, have 
contributed essays to this volume. 
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In 1993 Joe Stiglitz left academia for the world of policy, to join President 
Clinton’s Council of Economic Advisers, of which he eventually became Chairman, 
thereby holding a cabinet level position in the Clinton Administration. In 1997 he left the 
White House to become Senior Vice President and Chief Economist of the World Bank, a 
move that saw a strengthening of the close involvement with development that started his 
career and which he maintained throughout the years. In both of these policy positions, 
Joe argued against the strictures of orthodox economic policy, especially where it 
emanated from a market fundamentalism that Joe felt was not warranted in a world of 
imperfect information, imperfect competition and imperfect markets. In both of these 
positions, he came into conflict with the U.S. Treasury’s espousal of orthodox economic 
policies that Joe felt were not serving the interests of the population at large, in particular 
the poor. Particularly after the East Asia crisis, Joe spoke out against what he saw as 
policies that were economically wrong headed and detrimental to growth and poverty 
reduction in poor countries. The World Bank came under pressure from the U.S. Treasury 
to silence Joe, but rather than be silenced he resigned and returned to academia in 2000, 
first to Stanford and now at Columbia University. 
 
At first sight it is rather odd that there should be a need to develop a new 
economics for an imperfect world. Surely, all of economics should be about the world as 
it is. Even the use of the term “imperfections” stands in contradistinction to the usually 
assumed “perfections” of the world we analyze in our basic textbooks—perfect 
information, perfect competition, and so on. This was certainly true thirty-five years ago, 
when Joe Stiglitz began his economics education. It is sadly still the case for many basic 
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textbooks, although increasingly there are exceptions, and advanced textbooks do treat 
the imperfections of the real world. However, as Joe has argued, in the policy world it 
still seems that those who analyze and advise draw their basic instincts from the perfect 
information, perfect competition world of Econ 101, rather than the living, breathing 
world that we actually inhabit. 
 
A key feature of that world is asymmetric information. In most situations, the two 
sides of the market have vastly different information about the good or service being 
transacted. In particular, sellers typically know more about what they are selling than 
buyers do. This can lead to adverse selection where low quality products drive out good 
quality products unless other actions are taken. What sorts of actions? Agents may choose 
to signal information that they have and that other parties do not. For those with high 
quality products, it may be worthwhile doing this rather than be shut out from the market 
as good quality drives out bad. Or one side of the market may offer a menu of transaction 
terms, relying on the choices by the other side to screen transactors of one type from 
another. Offering such a menu may be better than continuing with imperfect information, 
but in order for it to play its role as a screening device, the menu has to have a structure 
that will separate out different types into preferring different parts of the menu. The 
theory then predicts that the types of transactions that we see will be different from those 
that would emerge in a world of perfect information. Combining signaling and screening 
further enriches the scope of the analysis. 
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Joe’s research often starts with a simple truth and then shows the profound 
consequences of that idea. Take for example the demonstration of the internal 
contradiction of perfect competition (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980). A long tradition in 
economics argues that one of the features, and indeed virtues, of perfect competition is 
that prices reflect all of the information in the market. But if that is the case, then no one 
has any incentive to gather any information. They can get it for free by looking at prices. 
However, if no one gathers information, then the prices do not have any information to 
reflect. The paradox lays the basis for the argument that imperfect information in markets 
is likely to be the rule, rather than the exception. Adam Smith’s invisible hand can be an 
imperfect guide, at best. 
 
Many if not most features of real world transactions can only be understood in an 
imperfect information framework. The work of Joe Stiglitz, his fellow Nobel Prize 
winners for 2001 George Akerlof and Michael Spence, and many others including 
contributors to this volume, elaborates on this point. Whether it be education as a 
screening device (Stiglitz, 1975), the insurance market (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976), 
market prices as aggregators and disseminators of information, (Grossman and Stiglitz, 
1980), unemployment as a worker discipline device (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984), price 
dispersion as a way of screening through search (Salop and Stiglitz, 1982), credit 
rationing (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981), macroeconomic fluctuations (Greenwald, Stiglitz 
and Weiss, 1984), or any of a host of other issues analyzed in the articles listed in his 
bibliography at the end of this volume, Joe Stiglitz has led the way in showing how the 
imperfect information paradigm can help us understand economic phenomena much 
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better. The enormous richness and potential of the paradigm he helped to create is well 
reflected in Part I of this volume of essays, which analyze problems ranging from 
insurance and financial regulation, through cultural equilibria and cooperation, to 
industrial organization. They are a fitting tribute to the continued vitality and relevance of 
Joe’s contributions in the area of imperfect information. 
 
While the Noble Prize was awarded for Joe’s seminal contributions on imperfect 
information, his influence on economics stretches far beyond even this gigantic 
achievement. Emerging partly from the imperfect information paradigm, but also from a 
realization of other sorts of imperfections in markets, Joe has made equally seminal 
contributions to Macroeconomics, Public Economics, and the Economics of 
Development and Transition. The papers in Part II of the volume reflect Joe’s 
contributions in these areas.  
 
Nobel Prize winners Robert Solow and George Akerlof are among those who 
contribute essays on macroeconomics and unemployment, on which Joe made an early 
contribution with his teacher (Solow and Stiglitz, 1968). A key aspect of Joe’s work in 
these areas is the recognition of the pervasiveness of imperfect competition. One of his 
most cited papers is Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), which developed an elegant model that has 
become the workhorse of the new literature on monopolistic competition, with 
applications in industrial organization, and in trade, as amply demonstrated by two of the 
papers in Part II. Joe’s work in Public Economics is characterized by the recognition of 
the imperfections of governments and the limited range of their instruments. The design 
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of tax and expenditure policies in this real world setting is enormously important for 
policy, but also exciting as an area of theoretical enquiry—Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) 
remains as important a part of graduate courses in Public Economics as when it first came 
out, almost a quarter of a century ago. This “Atkinson-Stiglitz” perspective is present in 
the Public Economics papers in Part II, including a paper co-authored by Nobel Prize 
winner Kenneth Arrow. Finally, a collection of papers on development and transition 
problems rounds out this tribute. As noted earlier, development issues have influenced 
Joe’s thinking profoundly (Stiglitz, 1974). But, equally, development thinking has been 
influenced greatly by Joe, especially at a conjuncture where the economics of Econ 101 
seems to be deployed to prescribe policies for countries where they are clearly not 
applicable. Failures of information, markets and governments are pervasive, and a 
sophisticated analysis is needed which also takes into account the needs of the poorest 
and most vulnerable (Stiglitz, 2002). The papers in Part II illustrate this well. 
 
Joe Stiglitz turns 60 in 2003. All of us who knew him first as a student, as a 
teacher, or as a colleague, see no diminution in his energies and in his creativity. This is 
good news. The world will go on being imperfect, and it will be important for Joe to go 
on producing more Economics for an Imperfect World, and to go on encouraging others 
to do so as well. Happy Birthday, Joe! 
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